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PREDATORY PRICING AFTER BROOKE GROUP:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
The past year began as one of anticipation for antitrust. For the first
time in more than a decade, the Democrats took over the White House
and changed the leadership of the Antitrust Division. The Supreme
Court's recent antitrust decision in Kodak' seemed pregnant with possibili-
ties for changing course.2 In part as a result of Kodak, commentators
were paying increasing attention to "post-Chicago" economic theories
that promise a solid academic grounding for a more interventionist inter-
pretation of the antitrust laws.'
Halfway through the year of anticipation, the Supreme Court decided
Brooke Group,4 a predatory pricing case. Price predation occurs when a
firm sets a low price, below an appropriate measure of its own costs, in
order to eliminate or reduce competition and thereby gain or preserve
the ability to exercise market power.5 This article considers whether the
Court, in Brooke Group, changed course in its analysis of predatory pricing
by adopting a "post-Chicago" view of the practice. The first two sections
describe the competing Chicago and post-Chicago perspectives on price
* Senior Economist, Council of Economic Advisers, and U.S. Department of justice.
The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Council of Economic Advisers, any
of its members, or the Justice Department. The author is indebted to Stephen Calkins,
Ronald Davis, Robert Hammond, William Kovacic, Mary Jean Moltenbrey, Steven Salop,
Peter Woodward, a referee, and the Robinson-Patman Act and Sherman Act Section 2
Committees of the American Bar Association's Section of Antitrust Law.
' Eastman Kodak Co. v. inage Tech. Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
2 See Joseph Kattan, Market Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62 ANTITRUST L.J.
1 (1993); Robert Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a
Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 143 (1993); Steven Salop, Kodak
as Post-Chicago Law and Economics, CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES PERSPECTIVES (April 1993).
' "The strategic oligopoly models [from which post-Chicago antitrust law and economics
derives] are typically richer and more complex than the standard Chicago models of
either perfect competition or monopoly ... [and] suggest a greater scope for antitrust
intervention .... " Salop, supra note 2, at 1. For a survey of post-Chicago economics, see
Jonathan Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (1989).
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
Id. at 2587-89.
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predation. Section III examines Brooke Group against this background,
and concludes that Brooke Group neither rejected nor embraced the new
perspective. By deferring its choice between the two approaches, the
Court has left the door open to a more activist antitrust analysis of
predatory pricing grounded in post-Chicago economics.
I. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL VIEW OF PRICE PREDATION
6
The Chicago School view of predatory pricing was perhaps best cap-
tured by a 1987 dispute between two FTC Commissioners over the apt-
ness of a metaphor: the animal that best represents price predation. For
one Commissioner, predatory pricing was a "white tiger," an extremely
rare creature. 7 For the other Commissioner, price predation more closely
resembled a "unicorn," a complete myth.8 The narrow spectrum of views
between a white tiger and a unicorn fairly reflects the Chicago School
view that predatory pricing is almost always irrational, and so is unlikely
actually to occur.
Chicago commentators consider below-cost pricing irrational largely
on the ground that a predator cannot reasonably expect to recoup its
initial losses through later price increases, after it induces its victim or
victims to exit, acquiesce to a takeover, or otherwise disappear as a com-
petitive threat. Recoupment appears implausible because the profits ex-
pected to follow the exit of the prey must substantially exceed the certain
losses that come from below-cost pricing, given both the time value of
money and the risk that the future profits will not be achieved.9
Future profits are uncertain for two reasons. A predator risks failure
because its low price may not induce its rival(s) to exit or otherwise stop
competing aggressively. In addition, in the event the victims do exit, the
predator's scheme will not have been worthwhile unless the subsequent
monopoly price is high enough for long enough to generate profits
sufficient to cover the initial losses. Yet that prospect is far from certain.
Before recoupment is complete, the predator's product may become
See generally John McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, I J.L.
& ECON. 137 (1958); ROBERr BORK, THE ANITRUST PARADOX 144-55 (1978). As McGee's
title suggests, one target of Chicago commentary was the prior business folklore that had
attributed the success of many "Robber Barons" to price predation.
7 Federal Trade Commission Authorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (Feb. 4,
1987) (remarks of Commissioner Mary Azcuenaga).
" Federal Trade Commission Authorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 13 (Feb.
4, 1987) (remarks of Commissioner Terry Calvani).
' Cf. Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Testing for Predation: Is Recoupment Feasible? 34
ANTITRUST BULL. 869 (1989) (proposing a test for assessing the feasibility of recoupment).
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obsolete or less desirable to buyers, or the subsequent monopoly price
may induce new entry."0
Recoupment appears even less plausible if the predator is an oligopoly
rather than a single firm. In addition to overcoming the above problems,
a predatory oligopoly must find a way both to coordinate a collective
reduction in price in order to drive out the targeted rivals, and to coordi-
nate a stable cartel in the event the predation is successful in reducing
competition. In some circumstances, it may be possible for the firms to
solve this problem in a simple way. In principle, for example, a predatory
oligopoly might tacitly or expressly delegate most of the output expansion
necessary to engender a reduction in price to a subset of its members.
The designated firms might be willing to accept this role, even though
the role requires that they pay a disproportionate fraction of the costs
of predation, if they expect to gain the most from the exit of the prey.
But even under the most favorable circumstances, these coordination
problems create an additional difficulty for a predatory oligopoly beyond
those facing a predatory monopolist.
To Chicago School scholars, episodes in which price appears to be less
than cost almost always reflect either errors in the measurement of cost
or competition, not price predation." This perspective properly high-
lights the difficulties that hinder the measurement of cost and the many
reasons that a competitive firm might price a product below short-run
variable cost.
If cost is measured incorrectly, a firm pricing at or above cost might
nevertheless appear to price below cost.'2 This possibility cannot be dis-
missed, given the difficult conceptual and measurement issues sur-
10 For example, if the prey is driven to exit from the market, the purchaser of its assets
may be a plausible candidate for supplying new competition. Similarly, a large customer,
fearing that successful predation would lead to an increase in the price of a product it
buys, could sign a long-term contract with the prey at a price above the predatory price
in order to preserve future competition.
" Hence, if predatory pricing ever were to occur, Chicago commentators believe that it
would do more harm than good to attack the predation under the antitrust laws. Any
good accomplished in doing so would be far outweighed by the harm arising from deterring
procompetitive price reductions throughout the economy by firms that fear that aggressive
competition might be mislabeled as predatory.
12 In some appellate circuits, fact-finders are instructed to compare price with marginal
(incremental) cost, and to employ (short-term) average variable cost as a proxy for marginal
cost in doing so. Other circuits require triers of fact to compare price with a measure of
average total cost. See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
227-34 (3d ed. 1992); infra at text accompanying note 35 (Brooke Group does not resolve
this conflict). An average total cost standard is often poorly defined because it frequently
requires arbitrary allocations of fixed, or common (joint), costs across products or regions.
1994]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
rounding the definition of cost.' For example, it is frequently difficult
to determine cost while the alleged predator is making substantial invest-
ments in acquiring physical capital, research and development, or devel-
oping a brand reputation (as through advertising). If accountants record
such investments as expenses in the period they are made, it is possible
that revenues will fall short of accounting expenses during that period,
and, in consequence, that average revenue (price) will be less than some
measure of cost. Such expenditures are not an appropriate basis for an
antitrust violation, even if accounting practice suggests that price is less
than cost during the investment period, unless the investments them-
selves harm competition.'
4
Moreover, a competitive firm's investments might include investments
in market share, undertaken through temporary or permanent price
reductions. 15 Indeed, economic theory suggests that a competitive firm
may price a product below its stand-alone short-run variable cost, with
no intention of engaging in price predation, when it obtains offsetting
benefits in the production or sale of other products (or in the production
or sale of the same product at a future time).' 6
Some hypothetical examples will illustrate this point. Competing spark
plug manufacturers might price sales to automobile manufacturers (for
inclusion in new cars) below cost in order to attract buyers of replacement
spark plugs if many replacement buyers stick with the original brand
even when charged a price above cost. 7 Competing copier manufacturers
" Accounting definitions of cost can diverge substantially from the economic concepts
that are relevant to an analysis of the rationality of firm strategies. For example, difficulties
in measuring reductions in the value of a firm's capital stock from depreciation often
make accounting measures of cost deviate from the corresponding economic concepts. See
Franklin Fisher & John McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer
Monopoly Profits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 82 (1983).
"' The contemporary (post-Chicago) economic literature describes ways firms can employ
nonprice investments strategically to make rivals behave less aggressively (e.g., by "raising
rivals' costs") or to deter entry. Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Steven
Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 335 (Papers & Proceedings 1979).
Under appropriate circumstances, for example, investments in production capacity, brand
reputation, product design, or test marketing; contractual arrangements with distributors
or key input suppliers; or lobbying the government for beneficial regulatory treatment
could be employed as methods of "nonprice predation."
" Cf. Michael L. Denger &John A. Herlort, Predatory Pricing Clains After Brooke Group,
62 ANTirRUST L.J. 541 (1994) (courts readily interpret below-cost pricing as compet-
itive when price reductions are temporary or associated with new product introduc-
tions).
"'The term "competitive firm" is used here in the sense of a firm unable to earn monopoly
profits because entry is easy. Such a firm may face a downward-sloping demand curve for
some of its products or have some ability to discriminate in price.
"7 This example is suggested by Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840
F.2d 1253 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 890 (1988).
[Vol. 62
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might price copiers below cost in order to attract buyers who can later
be charged above-cost prices for parts and service. Competing firms
producing both cameras and film might set camera prices below cost in
order to sell more film at high price-cost margins. Competing sellers of
some types of computer software might price their product below cost
when high switching costs inhibit migration of the installed base to rival
software, in order to increase the number of customers to whom they
can later sell high-margin upgrades. Competing truckers might price
certain freight movements below their stand-alone cost when those move-
ments permit the trucker to obtain high-margin back-haul business. Com-
peting computer manufacturers might price a new product below its
initial variable cost, in order to generate, through increased production
and sales, the scale economies and cost reductions from learning-by-
doing that would justify the low price. In all these cases, the reduction
of price below cost may reflect a procompetitive investment in future
competition,' not price predation.
Price predation is almost always irrational, according to the Chicago
School, because recoupment is almost always implausible. Hence, epi-
sodes of apparent below-cost pricing almost invariably reflect competition
rather than predation. Either below-cost pricing is a rational competitive
strategy or cost has been measured incorrectly. Thus, in the Chicago
zoological taxonomy, predatory pricing is a rare white tiger or a mythical
unicorn.
II. PRICE PREDATION IN POST-CHICAGO ECONOMICS 9
Post-Chicago economics provides a new theory of recoupment based
on the insight that if predation occurs in one market, recoupment can
occur rapidly and profitably in many other markets. 20 Post-Chicago eco-
s A firm exercising market power (through some means other than predatory pricing)
might also price one product low in order to benefit from cross-market or intertemporal
linkages that permit it to price another product high. For example, a copier manufacturer
exercising market power might price original equipment low relative to cost (perhaps even
below cost), and price parts and service well above cost. By exercising market power, the
firm can obtain a higher price for parts and service than it would receive through competi-
tion. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085-88.
'9 See generally Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in INDUS-
TRIAL STRUCTURE IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 112-37 (Giacomo Bonanno & Dario
Brandolini, eds. 1990); Janusz Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and
Antitrust in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537-96 (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert Willig, eds. 1989); William Comanor & H.E. Frech 11I, Predatory Pricing and the
Meaning of Intent, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 293, 294-97 (1993); cf. Louis PHLIPS, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF INFORMATION 197-242 (1988) (emphasizing limits to the practical applicability of
some contemporary economic theories of price predation).
0 One leading Chicago commentator anticipated this post-Chicago insight, recognizing
that the costs of predation "may generate greater deterrence benefits in other markets."
RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 186 (1976). However, this part of Posner's analysis
appears to have little influence on his Chicago School colleagues.
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nomics also challenges the Chicago view that recoupment is never plausi-
ble in the traditional single-market predation story. These two theoretical
developments imply that predatory pricing may be more plausible than
the unicorn and white tiger metaphors would suggest. To be sure, it is
too early to tell whether many instances of predation have been over-
looked by those who view firm behavior through Chicago School lenses.
An answer to this question must await empirical studies and litigation
framed by the new economic models.2 '
The new recoupment theory is suggested by the following hypothetical
example of price predation with multimarket recoupment. Suppose a
chain store faces a non-chain rival in each of a large number of towns.22
The chain cuts its prices drastically in a few towns. When the chain's
rivals in those towns either exit or begin to compete less aggressively
with the chain, the price war ends and high prices are restored. In
addition, the chain store's rivals in all the other towns, in which the chain
did not cut prices, also respond by avoiding aggressive competition with
the chain. As a result, prices also increase in the towns in which predation
did not occur.23
In this hypothetical example of price predation with multimarket re-
coupment, the firm developed a reputation as a predator 4 by reducing
price in a small number of markets. 25 It in effect engaged in selective
predation. The rivals in the markets in which predation occurred may
have ended up crippled or destroyed, as the traditional predatory pricing
story would have it. But rivals competing against the predator in markets
in which predation did not occur were not injured directly. Most of
the victimized rivals never experienced a price war but were merely
21 For one empirical example consistent with the new perspective, see Malcolm Burns,
Predatoy Pricing and the Acquisition Costs of Competitors, 94 J. POL. ECON. 266 (1986).
" The towns are separate geographic markets (defined from a demand-side perspective):
consumers will not travel from one to another for their shopping in order to avoid a small
but significant price increase. 1992 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.2, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (geo-
graphic market definition).
2' The example also assumes that new firms would not compete away supracompetitive
prices. For example, potential competitors may be deterred from entry for the same reason
that existing rivals are deterred from aggressive competition.
21 In order for the firm to develop a reputation as a predator, the economic models
require that the predator's rivals have imperfect information about some important variable
affecting firm strategies, such as the predator's costs or market demand. In a full informa-
tion setting, in contrast, a rival would have nothing to learn about the likelihood of predation
against it from the predator's behavior in other markets. Hence, the chain would find it
necessary to predate in each market in order to induce its rival in that market to exit (or
otherwise lessen competition).
15 In -he example, the other markets involved different geographic areas; a similar story
could b ! told involving different product markets.
[Vol. 62
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intimidated by the threat of a price war into engaging in less aggressive
behavior than they would otherwise have found most profitable.
26
Post-Chicago economics is also more sympathetic than the Chicago
School to the traditional single-market predatory pricing story-the uni-
corn or white tiger previously discussed. If imperfections in the market
for capital cause the prey to have less access to financial capital than the
predator, then the predator may reasonably expect to use its "deep
pockets" in the traditional way to drive the prey to exit.2 7 In addition, if
high prices following the exit of the prey are unlikely to be eroded by new
competition (because of entry barriers), predatory pricing with single-
market recoupment may no longer be an irrational strategy.
Post-Chicago economics also suggests that price-cost tests can be mis-
leading, even if cost is measured correctly. Chicago School scholars
pointed out that "false positives" (competitive behavior incorrectly
termed predatory) will arise if competitive firms price less than marginal
CoSt. 28 But post-Chicago economics recognizes that the potential errors
go in both directions: "false negatives" (anticompetitive predation that
does not lower price below the cost standard) may also occur.29 A firm
can deter aggressive competition with a low price, even if the low price
exceeds the price-cutter's average cost, so long as the price is sufficiently
low relative to its rivals' costs. 0 Hence, it is possible that competition can
be harmed by low prices even if those prices are not below the price-
cutter's costs.
3
'
26 In the hypothetical example, these firms refrained from cutting price below the price
the predator preferred, and they refrained from taking a larger market share than the
predator permitted them to have. In other cases, the indirectly victimized rivals might
refrain from soliciting the predator's customers, not expand into other markets, or agree
to be acquired at a low price.
27 For example, a firm in financial distress may have difficulty demonstrating to prospec-
tive lenders its prospects for future success or have difficulty convincing lenders that it
would actually use borrowed funds the way it proposes. If so, a predator with access to
significant internal funds might be able to withstand a price war longer than would a
victim that must borrow to stay in business. Recognizing that the prey may have difficulty
withstanding a price war commenced by the predator, a prospective predator might not
be deterred from cutting price below cost.
21 Supra at text accompanying notes 16-18.
29 The possibility of false negatives was not overlooked by early critics of price-cost tests
not associated with the Chicago School. See Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Trumping
the Areeda-Turner Test: The Recoupment Standard in Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 559
(1994).
30 For example, current or prospective rivals may be deterred from competing aggres-
sively when the predator charges a price sufficiently low as to make it impossible for the
rivals to earn revenues that cover both their variable costs and their avoidable fixed costs.
" Yet the possibility of false negatives does not necessarily call into question antitrust's
traditional use of a price-cost comparison as a screen for identifying possible instances of
price predation or the Chicago view that it is better to err on the side of allowing false
negatives. Infra at text accompanying notes 34-38.
1994]
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Thus, post-Chicago economics refuses to rule out the possibility that
successful predatory tigers may lurk in the marketplace jungle. The
primary new theoretical development is the identification of a new type
of predator, which cuts price in a handful of markets and creates a
reputation as an aggressive competitor. This type of predator recoups
the costs of predation not merely in the markets in which it engaged in
a price war, but also in other markets to which its reputation has spread,
by intimidating rivals in those markets to act less aggressively toward it.
Post-Chicago economic theory also suggests that a search for white ti-
gers-deep pocket predators-should be concentrated in industries in
which potential victims have constrained access to new financing as a
result of capital market imperfections, and in which entry by new compet-
itors is unlikely. But it remains to be seen how many new predators
plaintiffs, prosecutors, and empirical economists can find in these' pre-
viously unexplored areas.
II1. BROOKE GROUP
32
The Supreme Court decided Brooke Group against the backdrop of
these contemporary developments in the economics of price predation.
From this perspective, the decision is disappointing: It does not grapple
with the post-Chicago challenge to the Chicago point of view. The Court's
opinion will be discussed with respect to five issues. The record evidence
will be viewed throughout in the light most favorable to plaintiff Liggett,
as the Court was obliged to do. 3
A. PRICE-COST COMPARISONS
In asserting that the offense of price predation requires proof of
pricing below cost, the Court was neither accepting nor rejecting post-
Chicago views. The majority stated that a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate
predatory pricing must show that the defendant charged a price "below
an appropriate measure of [defendant's] cost.,
3 4
Although the Court expressly "decline[d] to resolve the conflict among
the lower courts over the appropriate measure of cost, '35 its discussion
of the issue appeared sympathetic to setting the cost standard at a low
" Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
33 The Supreme Court was obliged to construe the facts to benefit Liggett because
judgment as a matter of law was awarded against the plaintiff. Id. at 2582, 2599 n.3.
" Id. at 2587.
- Id. at 2587 n. 1. The cost standard was not in dispute in Brooke Group, as the plaintiff
did not contest the district court's view that a predatory price must be below average
variable cost. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 9 n. 10, Brooke Group.
[Vol. 62
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level, such as incremental cost.16 Doing so would likely be applauded by
Chicago-oriented commentators concerned that antitrust avoid wrongly
targeting some instances of competition for attack as predatory. Yet the
use of a cost screen to define the offense of price predation, 7 and the
choice of a low cost level for that screen, could also be consistent with
a post-Chicago perspective on predation-even though the new view
recognizes that a low cost standard could allow some instances of preda-
tion to escape enforcement.
A cost standard set at a low level may continue to be justified under
the post-Chicago view that recognizes the possibility of false negatives
as well as false positives. The reason is that the cost standard should be
set to minimize the aggregate social costs of the errors that the standard
allows. If competitive firms would frequently have an incentive to price
some products below cost and the social costs of deterring such competi-
tive pricing are large, then a cost standard set at a low level would
be justified-unless the frequency and social costs of anticompetitive
predation that does not involve price below the cost standard are also
large. From a post-Chicago perspective, therefore, the Court's continued
reliance on a cost screen to define predatory pricing and its sympathy
to raising a hurdle to predatory pricing allegations by setting that screen
at a low level of cost merely represent an empirical judgment about the
relative incidence and harm of false negatives and false positives.3 If
predatory conduct turns out to be more common and costly than the
Court now believes, its current judgment about the appropriate level of
the cost standard would then be called into question.
B. RECOUPMENT AS AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE
The Court made it abundantly clear, if it was not already obvious after
its opinions in Matsushita9 and Cargill,"° that the likelihood of recoupment
is an element of the offense of predatory pricing. 1 To prove price
'6 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
3' For a discussion of the benefits and costs of alternative ways of formulating legal rules,
including the use of screens, see Jonathan Baker, Per Se Rules in the Antitrust Analysis of
Horizontal Restraints, 36 ANTIrRUST BULL. 733, 740 n.29 (1991).
" The majority opinion emphasized that unless the cost standard was set at a low level,
the prohibition against price predation could chill aggressive and legitimate price competi-
tion by encouraging unwarranted and expensive predatory pricing litigation. 113 S. Ct.
at 2588.
3' Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-93 (1986).
'10 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 n.17 (1986).
4 In the wake of Brooke Group, defendants are likely to accept the Court's invitation to
argue for summary judgment when the market's structure following exit of the prey would
not be congenial to the exercise of market power. 113 S. Ct. at 2599; Denger & Herfort,
supra note 15.
19941
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predation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the predator had a "reason-
able prospect" (the Robinson-Patman Act standard for primary-line price
discrimination) or "dangerous probability" (the Sherman Act Section
2 standard for attempted monopolization) of recouping the costs of
predation. This requirement is consistent with both Chicago School
and post-Chicago economics; the two economic approaches differ on the
plausibility of certain potential mechanisms for recoupment, not on the
necessity for recoupment.4
C. RECOUPMENT BY AN OLIGOPOLY
The Court refused, as a matter of law, to rule out the possibility
that recoupment would take place through supracompetitive oligopoly
prices." This holding rejects the Chicago view that in the unlikely event
that price predation is successful, the predator must be a single firm
rather than a group of firms.4 5 This issue was raised in Brooke Group
because the defendant's (Brown & Williamson's) market share never
exceeded 12 percent.
46
Here, the Court's position is consistent with the post-Chicago view
that predatory pricing can occur in appropriate factual settings. In this
12 113 S. Ct. at 2588. Although the Court discussed the Sherman Act test, the predatory
pricing claim was evaluated under the Robinson-Patman Act standard. In its reference to
the Sherman Act § 2 test, the Court presumably meant that plaintiff must demonstrate a
dangerous probability of success in achieving monopoly power (not recoupment), and that
it must show a likelihood of recoupment in order to prove a dangerous probability of
achieving monopoly power. Stephen Calkins, The Supreme Court Term in Antitrust: More
Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 399 n.384 (1994).
" The dissent proposed inferring the likelihood of recoupment from the fact of below-
cost pricing, on the ground that below-cost pricing is otherwise irrational. 113 S. Ct. at
2605. The proposed inference requires ruling out both errors in measuring cost and
reasons why competitive firms might charge a price below cost (i.e., a legitimate business
justification for the practice). Although the dissent appeared to believe that the jury did
so, id. at 2604, infirmities in the jury instructions call that view into question. See Calkins,
supra note 42, at 381. The dissent also would have inferred the likelihood of recoupment
from defendant's contemporaneous belief, reflected in its planning documents, that the
firm would eventually recoup the costs of lowering price. 113 S. Ct. at 2600, 2606.
14 113 S. Ct. at 2591. Moreover, the Court accepted the possibility of recoupment through
coordinated oligopoly pricing, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff did not allege express
coordination among the cigarette oligopolists. See id. at 2590.
15 Although defendant Brown & Williamson insisted that it did not claim oligopolistic
predation was impossible as a matter of law, Calkins, see supra note 42, at 383 & n.298, it
nevertheless came very close to endorsing that proposition, id. at 385 n.307, and the Court
read the appellate opinion it affirmed as so holding. 113 S. Ct. at 2591.
46 113 S. Ct. at 2583. Because Brown & Williamson was the only member of the oligopoly
competing directly with Liggett in the generic segment, infra at text accompanying notes
47-48, and because generic and branded cigarettes are not perfect substitutes, Brown &
Williamson probably bore more of the costs of the alleged scheme to influence Liggett
through low generic prices than did any other member of the oligopoly. For this reason,
[Vol. 62
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respect, the Court has moved away from the Chicago idea, suggested by
the unicorn or white tiger metaphors, that predatory pricing is almost
invariably irrational.
D. MULTIMARKET RECOUPMENT
The Brooke Group Court did not address the post-Chicago idea that
recoupment may occur in a product or geographic market different
from the market in which the alleged predation took place. This issue
was not reached because the plaintiff's predatory pricing allegation was
closer to the deep pocket, white tiger story than to the chain store hypo-
thetical. The post-Chicago multimarket recoupment theory was not
squarely presented on the facts of the case.
As the Court described the facts the cigarette market has two relevant
segments: a low-priced generic segment and a high-priced branded seg-
ment. Plaintiff Liggett created the generic segment and had a significant
share of generic sales. However, its presence in the branded segment
was minor. Accordingly, at the time of the events giving rise to the
litigation, it was mainly a seller of generics. 7 In contrast, at the time of
the alleged predation, defendant Brown & Williamson was a significant
player in both branded and generic cigarettes. The other leading ciga-
rette producers were primarily sellers of branded products."' The generic
segment accounted for 4 percent of total domestic cigarette sales in 1984,
when the eighteen-month generic price war giving rise to the litigation
began, and rose to 15 percent of sales in 1989. '
By stipulation of the parties,t the Court depicted the two types of
cigarettes as separate segments of a cigarette market, but not as separate
markets.5 At the relative prices of brandeds and generics observed dur-
ing the relevant period, the two segments were sufficiently close demand
substitutes as to make it impossible for branded cigarettes to remain
if it was plausible that Brown & Williamson would recoup the costs of predation, recoup-
ment was also likely plausible for all the other firms in the industry.
17 In 1984, when Liggett accounted for 5% of the cigareite market, its generic cigarettes
accounted for more than 4% of the market. 113 S. Ct. at 2582-83.
4' However, R.J. Reynolds, a large producer of branded cigarettes, sold one of its many
branded products (Doral) at low prices comparable to those of generics. Id. at 2583. At
such prices, Doral was likely a closer substitute for generics than were most branded
cigarettes.
49 Id. at 2585.
30 Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 10-11, Brooke Group.
5 113 S. Ct. at 2583.
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insulated for long from the effect of a low price of generics.5 2 For this
reason, the inevitable consequence of Liggett's aggressive competition
in generics-pricing generics at a low level relative to the price of branded
cigarettes-would have been to force down the price of brandeds.
Plaintiff Liggett's theory of the case was that defendant Brown &
Williamson responded predatorily to Liggett's aggressive marketing of
generics when Brown & Williamson introduced its own generic line and
cut the price of generics dramatically. Liggett argued that Brown &
Williamson predated in generics but expected to recoup the costs of
predation primarily in brandeds,53 a much larger segment of the market.
If Brown & Williamson could induce Liggett to raise the price of generics,
Brown & Williamson would avoid the otherwise inevitable loss of profits
in brandeds, thereby recouping the cost of cutting price in the smaller
(generic) segment. 4
Here, predation occurs in one market segment-generics-while re-
coupment occurs primarily in another segment-brandeds. Were the
two segments different markets, the allegation might be interpreted as
a post-Chicago theory of multimarket recoupment. But because generics
and brandeds are part of the same market, Liggett's theory is best under-
stood as alleging deep pocket predation, in which both predation and
recoupment took place in the same market: the market for cigarettes.55
52 Id. at 2583 ("In general, the growth of generics came at the expense of tile other firms'
profitable sales of branded cigarettes."). The relationship between demand substitution and
market definition is discussed in the 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 22, § 1.
53 Petitioner's Reply Brief at 6-7 & n.7, Brooke Group.
54 113 S. Ct. at 2592 (according to Liggett, higher list prices on generics would reduce
"cannibalization of branded sales and their associated supracompetitive profits"). The
language in the Court's opinion may admit of an alternative reading, under which the
Court was troubled only about recoupment in the generic segment, the same segment in
which the alleged predation took place. Calkins, supra note 42, at 390. However, this
interpretation is difficult to rationalize with (1) a product market that includes both generics
and brandeds (suggesting that a price rise induced by predatory conduct could not be
limited to generics), and (2) defendant Brown & Williamson's primary reliance on brandeds
rather than generics for sales and profits (suggesting that if the alleged predatory scheme
were successful, Brown & Williamson would benefit largely by virtue of stopping the
decrease in branded prices). The majority found it unnecessary to articulate clearly where
recoupment was expected to occur because it held that the plaintiff had failed to demon-
strate that the price of generics would rise sufficiently. Infra at text accompanying notes
58-60. An increase in the price of generics forms a crucial factual predicate for recoupment
regardless of whether recoupment would be expected to occur primarily in generics or in
brandeds.
5' Liggett's deep pocket predation story has one novel twist: because the victim partici-
pated in only one segment of the market, the predator's price-cutting was not uniform
throughout the market. Instead, the price war was directed at the segment in which the
victim participated. Liggett alleged that Brown & Williamson sought to induce Liggett to
back off from aggressive competition in generics in order to avoid an otherwise inevitable
price reduction in brandeds. Because generics are not perfect substitutes for brandeds
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For this reason, the Brooke Group opinion did not address the plausibility
of multimarket recoupment, an important new idea in the post-Chicago
economic literature on price predation.
Nor did the Court see the case as presenting a post-Chicago deep-
pocket predation story. The Court recognized that the jury could have
found that Liggett was unwilling to sustain losses imposed by Brown &
Williamson's below-cost pricing of generics, "given [Liggett's] corporate
parent's efforts to locate a buyer for the company. ' ' 6 It is possible that
a post-Chicago deep-pocket predation theory could be constructed con-
sistent with this finding, in concert with record evidence that Brown &
Williamson believed it could take advantage of Liggett's limited financial
resources.5" Although it was obliged to interpret the record in the light
most favorable to Liggett, the Court did not investigate the possibility
of a capital market imperfection hobbling Liggett's access to financing
relative to that of Brown & Williamson.
Even if Liggett's claim could reasonably be construed as alleging
multimarket recoupment, the Court did not reach the question of
whether recoupment could occur in a different market segment from
the segment in which predation occurred. Instead the Court correctly
observed that Liggett's theory of the case required that Brown & William-
son's predation in generics would, in the first instance, lead Liggett to
raise the price of generics and through that mechanism stop the otherwise
inevitable loss of supracompetitive profits in brandeds.5" An increase in
the price of generics sufficient to preserve a supracompetitive price for
brandeds, thus formed the "linchpin" of the predatory scheme alleged
by Liggett.5 9
(even at the price differential created by the alleged predation), and because Liggett's
business was concentrated in generics while Brown & Williamson's business was concen-
trated in brandeds, a predation strategy lowering prices more for generics than brandeds
would likely minimize Brown & Williamson's losses from below-cost pricing without reduc-
ing the costs the low prices would impose on Liggett.
56 113 S. Ct. at 2592.
" Petition for Certiorari at 7, Brooke Group; Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 1989 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,583 at 61,111 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (ruling on
motions for summary judgment); Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344, 354 (M.D.N.C. 1990), affd, 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd
sub nom. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
5" The Court writes as though recoupment would require a "supracompetitive" price
for generics. 113 S. Ct. at 2592-93. In fact, because recoupment would occur primarily
in branded cigarettes, see supra at notes 53-54 and accompanying text, recoupment requires
no more than that the generic price increase enough to allow a sufficiently high (and
supracompetitive) branded price to be sustained. It is therefore possible that a generic
price rise short of raising the generic price above the competitive level would be sufficient
to allow Brown & Williamson to recoup its losses from predation. It is also possible that
some supracompetitive generic prices would not be sufficiently high to permit recoupment.
'9 113 S. Ct. at 2593.
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After extensive analysis, the Court found that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to allow a jury to find that the price of generics had a reasonable
prospect of rising enough as a result of Brown & Williamson's predation
to make recoupment possible. 60 The Court did not reach the issue of
whether recoupment could occur in products different from those al-
leged to have been the subject of the predation, because it did not need
to in order to decide the case.
E. JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
The Brooke Group Court boldly decided to award judgment as a matter
of law and overrule the jury.6' The Court's crucial factual determination
was that the record evidence, examined in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, would not support the conclusion that the alleged predation had
a reasonable prospect of causing the price of generics to rise sufficiently to
permit recoupment. Yet the Court took the case from the jury to award
judgment to the defendant when the record on this key question of fact,
construed favorably to plaintiff, arguably supported plaintiff's position.6"
Although the best explanation for this outcome is that the Court reviewed
the record through Chicago School lenses that presume the implausibility
of predatory pricing,6" in doing so the Court did not reject a post-Chicago
perspective because it was not asked to view the record with post-Chicago
economic developments in mind.
In reaching the conclusion that the price of generics had no reasonable
prospect of rising sufficiently as a result of the alleged predation to
permit recoupment, the Court acknowledged that a reasonablejury could
"0 Id. at 2593-98. This evidence is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 61-85.
In Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2083, the Court clarified that there is no special summary
judgment rule for antitrust cases that encourages judges to weigh evidence and take such
cases from the jury. Some had previously read Matsushita to say otherwise. E.g., Thomas
Jorde & Mark Lemley, SunnaiyJudgmnent in Antitrust Cases: Understanding Monsanto and
Matsushita, 36 ANTIrRUST BULL. 271, 293 (1991).
62 The Supreme Court's 1986 predatory pricing decision, Matsushita, does not provide
precedent for this result. In Matsushita, the Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision to
send a predatory pricing case to trial when the district court had previously awarded
sunmary judgment. The Court remanded the case with instructions virtually ordering
reinstatement of the original judgment. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 807 F.2d 44 (3d
Cir. 1986). The Court was in effect willing to take the Matsushita case from the jury
when the evidence favoring the losing plaintiff was extremely meager-in contrast with
its decision to take Brooke Group from the jury when the record cotld arguably have been
construed in favor of the losing plaintiff.
13 Calkins, supra note 42, at 394. Cf. Kenneth L. Glazer, Predatopy Pricing and Beyond:
Life After Brooke Group, 62 ANTrTRUSr L.J. 605 (1994) (Brooke Group raises high barriers
for plaintiffs alleging predatory pricing).
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have concluded that generic prices rose in fact. 64 This finding, favorable
to plaintiff, did not end the majority's analysis, however, because the
majority resisted the conclusion that the alleged predation caused the
generic price increase. Instead, the majority found that the evidence did
not distinguish an anticompetitive price increase (resulting from the
alleged predation and sufficient to permit recoupment) from a price rise
that would have occurred in a competitive market-had the demand for
generics shifted out along a rising marginal cost curve.65
The majority's conclusion about causation is surprising, however, for
two reasons. First, because generics and brandeds are likely supply substi-
tutes (in both production and distribution),66 the competitive price rise
the majority postulates would have required an outward shift of the
demand function for cigarettes as a whole. This theory about demand
growth would have been more plausible had the cigarette industry been
growing. Second, the majority's competitive theory does not fit comfort-
ably with the Court's observation that the cigarette industry had substan-
tial excess capacity.6 1 Industry excess capacity could suggest to a reason-
able jury that the marginal cost of production is not rising, and thus lead
the jury to rule out the majority's competitive alternative to finding that
the alleged predation caused the price of generics to rise,68 the inference
that was required in order to uphold thejury verdict in favor of plaintiff.
The Court provided an additional reason for refusing to permit the
jury to find that the price of generics would likely increase stfficiently
to permit recoupment. It argued that important features of cigarette
industry structure tend to suggest that an anticompetitive price increase
would be difficult to arrange and maintain in the cigarette oligopoly.69
The Court's willingness to make this inference from industry structure
64 113 S. Ct. at 2595 ("It may be that a reasonablejury could conclude that the cumulative
discounts attributable to subgenerics and the various consumer promotions did not cancel
out the full effect of the increases in list prices ... and that actual prices to the consumer
did indeed rise .... ").
65 id. at 2595 ("Where, as here, output is expanding at the same time prices are increasing,
rising prices are equally consistent with growing product demand [as with supracompetitive
pricing]."). Because output was expanding for generics but not for the cigarette industry
as a whole during the 1980s, 964 F.2d at 338, the Court appears to be referring to the
generic segment.
66 748 F. Supp. at 363.
67 113 S. Ct. at 2583, 2595.
68 Because generics and brandeds are likely supply substitutes, the relevant capacity
measure is for cigarettes as a whole. Hence, a shift in consumer tastes to favor generics,
the Court's proposal, would be unlikely to lead to an increase in the price of cigarettes in
either segment through the mechanism proposed by the Court.
69 113 S. Ct. at 2596-97.
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is surprising, however, given that the Court acknowledged elsewhere that
oligopolistic coordination had somehow managed to persist for decades. 0
The Court's analysis of industry structure, from which it concluded
that the industry environment was not congenial to coordination, has a
distinctly Chicago flavor. The majority's discussion of four aspects of
industry structure was not informed by insights derived from post-Chi-
cago developments in oligopoly theory that qualify Chicago views and
suggest why coordination could occur in the cigarette industry. 7' First,
the majority recognized that an industry facing declining demand and
excess capacity might perform competitively, 72 but it did not note the
possibility, also consistent with contemporary economic theory, that these
structural features might instead facilitate coordination. Excess capacity
can facilitate coordination by increasing the ability of the oligopoly to
punish firms that deviate. Declining demand can facilitate coordination
by limiting the gains from cheating, thereby making deviation from a
high coordinated price unattractive.
Second, the majority argued that the large number of product types
and pricing variables in the cigarette industry creates a complex and
difficult coordination task.73 Yet the majority did not consider the possi-
bility that firms could employ focal rules to turn what the Court termed
"multivariable coordination" into a much simpler problem. 74 Third, the
majority recognized that firms with different incentives might be unable
71 Id. at 2583; see id. at 2599 (Stevens,J., dissenting). The Court found Liggett's theory that
the cigarette oligopoly could engineer a price rise "anomalous" in light of the predictable
testimony of Liggett's executives denying participation in an illegal industry conspiracy to
increase price. Id. at 2595. Yet there need be no inconsistency: oligopolies can achieve high
prices through coordination without necessarily reaching an agreement tinder Sherman Act
§ 1. Jonathan Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly
Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 162-69, 190 (1993).
The Court also refused to give weight to the testimony of plaintiff's economic expert
about recoupment. The Court did not disagree with the expert's economic analysis; rather,
it concluded that the factual predicates assumed by the expert could not have been found
by the jury from the trial record. 113 S. Ct. at 2597-98.
" Developments in economic theory involving horizontal coordination bear on predatory
pricing claims only when the alleged predator is an oligopoly, as in Brooke Group.
72 113 S. Ct. at 2595-96.
71 Id. at 2596.
74 In general, coordinating firms might reach a consensus by establishing as focal (self-
evident) one or more simple and readily grasped behavioral rules. For example, the firms
might preserve existing price differentials across product types and brands, and preserve
existing percentage discounts to wholesalers or retailers, while merely altering the entire
structure of prices by a common percentage. In the instant case, predation and recoupment
might be coordinated by altering the prices of all generic products by one appropriate
percentage and the prices of all branded products by another percentage. By grandfa-
thering most of the terms of trade in this way, the firms could simplify their coordination
problem dramatically. Baker, supra note 70, at 162-69.
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to reach an oligopolistic consensus. 75 But the majority did not note that
those incentives would need to diverge a great deal before making it
impossible for the firms to identify a coordinated outcome at which
coordination is more preferable than competition to each. 6
Finally, the majority pointed out that uncertainty could make an oligop-
olistic consensus unstable, susceptible to breaking down through "a chain
reaction of competitive responses. 77 The opinion emphasizes that rival
sellers of branded cigarettes (such as Philip Morris) could not be sure
that Brown & Williamson, in entering the generic segment in competition
with Liggett, was acting to deter Liggett from competing aggressively.
According to this view, these rivals might conclude that Brown & William-
son was also competing aggressively, and that the oligopolistic consensus
over the price of branded cigarettes was breaking down.
This observation is not decisive, however, for four reasons not recog-
nized by the Court. First, the other members of the cigarette oligopoly
did not in fact respond to Brown & Williamson's entry into generics by
competing aggressively, contrary to what the majority forecast." Second,
even if the majority's forecast had proved correct, that result would
not necessarily undermine the alleged predatory scheme. Aggressive
competition would drive prices even lower and so increase Liggett's losses
during the period of predation. If this were to occur, it could strengthen
the punishment Brown & Williamson was allegedly trying to impose
upon Liggett through below-cost pricing and, by strengthening the in-
ducement to Liggett to raise its price for generics, make recoupment
more likely.
Third, the majority does not recognize the possibility that the other
members of the cigarette oligopoly delegated the primary punishment
role to the defendant. 79 Brown & Williamson may have been willing to
accept this role, even though it would bear a disproportionate fraction
of the cost of predation, because it may have expected to gain the most
75 113 S. Ct. at 2596-97.
76 Baker, supra note 70, at 168 n.48. Mavericks are more likely to constrain coordinated
prices from full effectiveness than to make coordination impossible altogether. Id. at 202.
From this perspective, the cigarette oligopoly intended the alleged predation to change
the incentives of the most significant industry maverick, Liggett. Liggett's incentives to
deviate from a coordinated outcome came from its relatively small allegiance to the branded
segment of the market and its relatively large commitment to the generic segment. The
divergence of interest among the remaining major cigarette producers was likely small,
although R.J. Reynolds, with its economy-priced Doral brand, may have been the firm
most likely to have constrained coordination in the absence of Liggett.
" 113 S. Ct at 2597.
78 Petitioner's Reply Brief on Certiorari at 8, Brooke Group.
71 Supra at text accompanying notes 10- 11.
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from disciplining Liggett.80 Under such circumstances, Brown & William-
son's low price would not have led to a competitive chain reaction from
its rival oligopolists.
Fourth, the majority does not recognize that coordination can be harm-
ful even if it is imperfect and incomplete, as in contemporary economic
models in which an oligopolistic consensus breaks down for a time before
reforming."1 Uncertainty may be an oligopoly's "greatest enemy, 82 but
oligopolists may be able to defeat that enemy when the costs of negotiat-
ing and, if necessary, renegotiating the oligopoly consensus are low. 8 3
These post-Chicago developments were not noted by the Court in
Brooke Group, and they were not brought to the Court's attention by the
parties to the case.8 4 In sharp contrast, briefs before the Court in the
Kodak litigation referenced and discussed the post-Chicago economic
literature relevant to that case. Against this background, it is not surpris-
ing that the Court relied exclusively on Chicago School ideas concerning
price predation and oligopolistic coordination in Brooke Group, while
accepting a post-Chicago economic perspective concerning the issues
addressed in Kodak.85
IV. CONCLUSION
The Chicago School view that predatory pricing is highly unlikely to
occur now competes with a post-Chicago perspective more sympathetic
" Among the firms selling branded cigarettes, Brown & Williamson was the most affected
by Liggett's introduction of generics because many of its brands were close substitutes for
generics. Brown & Williamson accounted for 11.4% of branded cigarette sales, but 20%
of those switching to Liggett's generics switched from a Brown & Williamson brand. 113
S. Ct. at 2583.
"' Baker, supra note 70, at 160-62.
12 113 S. Ct. at 2596.
13 Baker, supra note 70, at 169 n.49. On the other hand, if the oligopolistic consensus
can be renegotiated cheaply and if it is difficult for the oligopolists to monitor and police
deviation, a firm aware of these facts could conclude that it would not be punished for
deviation and, in consequence, could become more likely to deviate.
" Liggett's submissions to the Court did not refer to this literature. Brown & Williamson
referenced it once-merely to dismiss "the far-fetched theories of tacit collusion described
in the economics literature"-without significant exposition. Respondent's Brief on the
Merits at 39, Brooke Group. Hence, the Brooke Group opinion's absence of a discussion of
contemporary developments in the economics of oligopolistic coordination should not be
interpreted as rejecting the application of those developments to the analysis of coordinated
behavior under Sherman Act § 1, nor to the analysis of the likelihood of coordination
resulting from merger under Clayton Act § 7.
" Perhaps the Court was willing to decide Brooke Group rather than remanding the case
as in Kodak because the Brooke Group plaintiff had full discovery and a trial while discovery
had been truncated in Kodak. This observation does not, however, explain why Brooke
Group was decided for defendant when the facts, taken in their light most favorable to
Liggett, arguably support the plaintiff.
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to the possibility of price predation. In Brooke Group, the Supreme Court
largely declined to choose between these economic perspectives. The
Court.stepped away from the Chicago view by refusing to reject, as a
matter of law, the possibility of recoupment through oligopolistic coordi-
nation. The Court did not consider the post-Chicago contention that
multimarket recoupment is plausible, or the post-Chicago suggestion
that deep pocket predation could be successful if the prey has limited
access to financial resources. But it awarded judgment as a matter of law
based on Chicago School presumptions, without reconsidering Chicago
arguments in light of contemporary developments in economics.
The primary message of the Supreme Court's two most recent major
antitrust decisions, Kodak and Brooke Group, taken together, is not about
the significance of the facts in antitrust litigation, contrary to what some
commentators argued in the wake of Kodak. 6 Rather, these decisions
demonstrate that antitrust law continues to demand a careful economic
analysis of the challenged conduct. In deciding both Brooke Group and
Kodak, the Court relied heavily on its view of economic logic and the
teaching of economic authorities. In Kodak, the Court embraced post-
Chicago economic arguments that were called to its attention by the
parties and were consistent with the facts under review. In contrast, post-
Chicago economic arguments were not before the Court in Brooke Group,
and the Court relied on the most current economic arguments of which
it was aware-the Chicago-oriented approach it had adopted seven years
before in Matsushita.
Brooke Group should not be read as rejecting post-Chicago economic
arguments in antitrust matters. Rather, the Supreme Court's willingness
to entertain the idea of recoupment through oligopolistic coordination
in Brooke Group, combined with its contemporary economic analysis in
Kodak, suggest that it will accept post-Chicago interpretations of chal-
lenged conduct if they are squarely posed in the matter under review,
called to the Court's attention by the parties, and consistent with the
facts.
86 E.g., Gordon B. Spivack & Carolyn T. Ellis, Kodak: Enlightened Antitrust Analysis and
Traditional Tying Law, 62 ANTITRuST L.J. 203 (1993).
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